Abstract. In this paper we extend the series of our studies on the properties of an interacting particle model for market microstructure. In our earlier work we defined a Markov process on the majority opinion of the agents, obtained the transition probabilities and analyzed the martingale properties of the ensuing wealth process. Here we relax the assumption on the choices of individual agents by allowing mixed strategies, offering opportunities for the agents to gain intermediate submartingale exposure for their individual wealth processes. We develop a novel two-dimensional spin system to model the critical regions of the wealth process as a reflection of the agents' behaviors. We exhibit strategic conflicts between individual market participants and the market as a whole, and identify a new source of uncertainty arising from 'reinforced expectations'.
Introduction
A series of interacting particle models have been proposed over the past decade to describe the dynamics of agent-based market microstructure models [1, 3, 6, 8, 9] . Often, these models use techniques from non-equilibrium statistical mechanics to investigate the tradeoff between the safety of trend following and the necessity of anticipating the majority in order to generate profits [4, 5, 2, 10] .
In our earlier work, we extended such a spin market model, originally introduced by Bornholdt et.al. [7] , and characterized analytically its invariant measure. Also, we investigated the aggregate market wealth dynamics [12] . This work led to an appreciation of the asymmetry between different quasi-stable supply-demand imbalance levels.
The current paper extends the earlier framework by allowing the agents, with a certain probability, to choose strategically their next action, rather than be subject to the Hamiltonian dynamics on the space of spin configurations.
In our revised model we extend the state space of our Markov Chain to include a set of supply/demand imbalance levels which represent the market participant's expectations. The resulting hybrid dynamics represent a mixture of the original hamiltonian stochastic dynamics presented in [11] and the strategic dynamics of these expectation sets. We use this setting to investigate the concept of strategic stability that we introduced in [12] and discover situations where the individual agent's strategies are in conflict with the overall market interest. This finding provides a setting in which to investigate the social benefits of market coordination.
Furthermore, the extended stochastic process we introduce here possesses regimes of non-unique invariant measure. We interpret the resulting path dependence as an example of reinforced belief dynamics, whereby an arbitrary choice attains physical importance purely because a sufficient number of agents share it. Such 'self fulfilling prophecies' are a hallmark of the strongly interacting nature of markets, and constitute a main ingredient of any behavioral market model. It is our hope that the current model can help bridge the conceptual gap between physically motivated spin market models and their behavioral counterparts.
A Two-Dimensional Spin Process
In this study, we modify the spin market model presented in [11] . Specifically, we will allow each agent to act strategically (in a sense to be defined below) with a fixed exogenous probability q. Let X denote the set of spin configurations on a lattice on the d-dimensional
for an appropriately chosen L so that |Y | = N . It is convenient to identify the elements of Y with unique labels from the set {1, 2, . . . , N }. Formally, we accomplish this by choosing a homeomorphism ϕ : Y −→ {1, 2, . . . , N }.
The state space of our revised process is X = X ×X where the second component of a typical state (ζ 1 , ζ 2 ) represents a subset G ⊂ Y , i.e. y ∈ G ⇐⇒ ζ 2 (y) = 1. This can be seen as the assignment of a 'two-dimensional spin' to the lattice Y , i.e.
2 . The path of a typical element of X is given by η : Y × (0, ∞) −→ {−1, 1} 2 and each site x ∈ Y is endowed with a (typically ℓ 1 ) neighborhood N (x) ⊂ Y it inherits from the natural topology on the torus T d . As before, for each x ∈ Y , N (x) is a uniformly chosen random subset of Y , of cardinality 2d. To be more precise, for a set A and a positive integer k, let
. . , k . Then, for any x ∈ Y , let {N (x, ·)} be a family of iid uniform random variables taking values in F (Y \ {x}, 2d).
We construct a continuous time Markov process with transitions occurring at exponentially distributed epochs, T n , with rate 1. We proceed as before to construct a transition matrix for the spins, based on the following interaction potential:
where α > 0 is the coupling constant between local and global interactions. As discussed in [11] , observe that, as a result of the neighborhood randomization procedure we introduced, h(x, t) depends only on the first dimension of the spin at x, η 1 (x, t), and N + (t) .
e. the total number of positive spins. Specifically, consider two independent families of iid hypergeometric random variables, {U 1 , U 2 , . . .} and {V 1 , V 2 , . . .}, with parameter vectors (N − 1, i − 1, 2d) and
We see that, conditional on {N + (T n−1 ) = i} ∩ {η 1 (x, T n−1 ) = ±1}, the distribution of h(x, T n ) is the same as that for h ±1 (i, T n ). The flips of the first spin dimension are governed by:
where (a, b) ∈ {−1, 1} 2 and β is the normalized inverse temperature. At time T n (i.e. the n th epoch) a random site J n is chosen uniformly from Y . The variables ρ ab are interpreted as the resulting flip probabilities for the first spin dimension of J n , i.e.
If we let
we have
As stated so far, the transition probabilities ofX (and therefore N + ) could be random. In particular, for t ∈ [ T n−1 , T n ) , even though h a (i, t) is measurable with respect to
. In order to describe the transition probabilities for the second component of our stochastic process, we need to define the wealth process [12] :
where W (y, 0) = K(y), representing the initial capital available to agent y, and ∆P (T n ) . = P (T n ) − P (T n−1 ) is the price change at the n th epoch. In what follows, we will allow a more general price impact function than in our earlier models, as follows:
where f is a function that maps transient supply/demand imbalancesX n to price shocks. The only assumptions we make about this impact function f is that it is nondecreasing in the first argument and nonincreasing in the second argument, and that it maps the balanced market to the fundamental price, i.e. f (0, N ) = 0. In what follows, we use γ to denote the ratio of the price impact of an incremental seller to that of an incremental buyer, i.e. γ =
Let P β ab (i) be independent random variables, identically distributed with the iid family ρ ab (1, β, i, ·). These represent the purely stochastic transitions of the first spin dimension investigated in [11] . Using them, we define
which is a random variable so long as β < ∞, inheriting the randomness of h ±1 (i, ·). On the other hand, as discussed in [11] , in the frozen phase of this process, almost surely,
which is not random. The role that ρ played for the transitions of the first spin dimension will now be played by λ for the second spin dimension. Specifically, for (a, b) ∈ {−1, 1} 2 and
Note that the event E β
N , which occurs generically with probability zero, would be added to the computation of λ aa , i.e. the probability of not flipping the second spin dimension. The variables λ ab are interpreted as the flip probabilities for the second spin dimension of at the n th epoch, i.e. for t ∈ [ T n−1 , T n ) and all x ∈ Y ,
Convergence Results
Observe that, unlike the first spin dimension, the second one is updated synchronously for all sites. Furthermore, using (2.1) we see that in the frozen phase, λ ab ∈ {0, 1}, because E β + is no longer random. In particular, let
Then:
Theorem 3.1. There are four distinct behaviors for η 2 :
The third case entails path dependence, while the fourth leads to oscillating behavior.
In the rest of this paper, we will focus on the frozen phase (β → ∞). Let P ab (i) = lim β→∞ P β ab (i). As we saw in [11] ,
and C n k denoting the combinations n choose k.
The following theorem describes the invariant measure of N + in this new twodimensional spin process, extending Proposition 1 from [11] : 
if ℓ > 0 and g(0) = 1 Finally, when A 3 = ∅, no invariant measure exists for the two-dimensional spin process, because η 2 never settles for the points in A 3 . Figure 1 shows how the invariant measure varies as we decrease q away from 1. The case q = 1, which was treated in [11] , always led to symmetric tri-modal distributions. Here we observe that even a modest amount of strategic interaction leads to pronounced skew in the invariant measure.
The bottom two frames of figure 2 show how the existence and uniqueness of the invariant measure described in Theorem 3.2 above depend on the value of q (we will return to the top frame of figure 2 in section 4). Specifically we see that there is typically a contiguous range of small enough values of q for which the invariant measure does not exist. Thus, when strategic interactions dominate the market, agents expectations of desirable levels of supply/demand imbalance never settle down, indefinitely forcing the agents to chase unattainable majority/minority levels.
On the other hand, there are islands of non-uniqueness throughout the range of q values, brought on by intermittent occupation of A 2 . Except for sufficiently low values of q, the non-uniqueness is driven by very few (often only one) imbalance level whose status as desirable (or not) is determined by the initial conditions. The resulting path dependence propagates throughout the invariant measure.
For instance, as we can see in figure 2 , the case q = 0.7 leads to a non-unique invariant measure because there is one imbalance level (it turns out to be N + = 61) which is mapped by η 2 in A 2 . The two resulting invariant measures are shown in figure 3 . As we see, the flip of a single η 2 value in the initial conditions leads to more than double the limiting probability for a substantial range of seller-dominated imbalance levels. In fact, all imbalance levels are impacted by at least a few percentage points relative change in the limiting distribution. This phenomenon can be interpreted as a sort of fad dynamic, a positive feedback of reinforced expectations with a surprisingly global and persistent effect. The invariant measure changes qualitatively as γ decreases towards −1 and α increases. Specifically, more symmetric price impact (γ ց −1) leads to a steeper concentration of measure as q decreases away from 1. In particular, as we increase the strategic interaction of the agents, all but one of the modes decrease rapidly, effectively concentrating the limiting distribution around the global mode. This is shown in figure 4 , which depicts the concentration of limiting probability within two imbalance levels of the global mode.
On the other hand, increasing the overall coupling constant (α ր ∞) moves the modes closer together without attenuating their height, until they are eventually merged. The transition to unimodal limiting distribution occurs at the 'kink' in the right most column of graphs in figure 4 , for the value of q which minimizes the concentration of measure phenomenon. This effect is shown in figure 5 .
Multimodal invariant measures imply the existence of distinct imbalance attractors. Invariant measures more concentrated around their global mode imply markets with narrower price fluctuations. Therefore, even modest increases in the amount of strategic interaction among the agents quickly decrease the spread and complexity of the resulting price fluctuations. Moreover, this effect becomes more pronounced for more symmetric impact functions and more loosely coupled (less frustrated) agents.
There also exist situations in which the invariant measure exhibits exceptional sensitivity to the amount of strategic interaction among the agents. Figure 6 shows an example of this phenomenon. This radical shift in the imbalance attractor, from an average value of 10.84 at q = 0.11 to an average value of 87.71 at q = 0.12! Such large scale rebalancing of the invariant measure is likely to lead to discontinuous jumps in the resulting price process, due solely to a slight decrease in the strategic component of the interaction potential.
The Wealth Process Revisited
We are now interested in characterizing the martingale properties of W (y, ·) as well as the aggregate wealth, W , defined as
Using (2.1), after some algebra we arrive at
and
Using the invariant measure from Theorem 3.2 we can define ∆W k ∞ as the expectation, under the invariant measure π ∞ , of the expected wealth increment at the k th transaction time:
We can now return to the top frame of figure 2 which depicts ∆W k ∞ . As we see, the highest value of expected market wealth increments is achieved for a level of q close to 0.6. Specifically, the maximum value, 3.9128, is achieved for q = 0.56 and the invariant measure is not unique, because η 2 (59) ∈ A 2 . On the other hand the second highest value, 3.9102, is achieved for q = 0.62 and the invariant measure is unique. In fact, with the exception of narrow islands restricted to q < 0.3, the market expects to make money under the conditions in figure 2 .
We proceed to iterate this computation of the optimal level of strategic interaction q * and the resulting maximum attainable expected market wealth increment ∆W k * ∞ as we vary α and γ (figure 7). We can make the following observations regarding the sensitivity of the expected market wealth increments to changes in the impact function asymmetry (γ) and the overall coupling constant (α):
• For all values of γ, the optimal choice of Strategic interaction level q leads to non-negative expected wealth increments for the market at large.
• When the impact function is symmetric (γ = −1), the market can no longer make positive returns. Thus it is the impact function asymmetry that sustains positive expectations of broad market returns.
• Modest positive impact asymmetry (incremental buy has slightly more effect than incremental sell) leads to the minimum desirable amount of strategic interaction.
• As the global coupling constant is increased, more strategic interaction is desirable while the attainable returns decrease.
• When the coupling constant is increased beyond a sufficiently high value (around 5.9 for the example shown in figure 7 ), all agents act exclusively strategically. Consider now the majority opinion of the agents,
Combining (4.1) and (4.2) we arrive at the following observation: Thus, there are cases when coordination of the agents to achieve a 'common objective' is desirable over individual optimization of their respective strategic interaction strengths.
Conclusions and Next Steps
In this paper we presented a two-dimensional spin market model. The first spin dimension represents the agents' decision to buy or sell, as in earlier models. The second spin dimension encodes a subset of supply/demand imbalance levels which are deemed to be desirable, because they lead the agent under consideration to experience a submartingale wealth process.
We extended the analysis from [11] to describe the invariant measure of this novel process. Our principal findings are that, under certain conditions the resulting invariant measure is not unique, depending sensitively on initial conditions. We interpret this behavior as a type of 'fad dynamic'. Also, there exist conditions under which the market disagrees with the majority of the agents in its assessment of the desirability of certain imbalance levels. Thus, coordination across the agents adds value beyond that attainable by individual optimization by the agents.
It is natural to extend further our model by allowing each agent to adjust their degree of strategic interaction (q) dynamically as they experience the process. The resulting evolutionary game could provide insight into periodic imbalance attractors. On the other hand, the thermodynamic limit (N → ∞) of this process is likely to provide estimates of the occupation density around individual imbalance levels.
